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█ Abstract In this paper, two main aspects of Cristina Meini’s From Cradle to Internet. The Social Nature 
of Personal Identity are taken into consideration. In the first place, Meini’s argument concerning the struc-
turing role for self development of caregivers’ communicative mirroring is analysed in the light of current 
literature concerning the multi-layered architecture of identity. I propose to integrate Meini’s interesting 
socio-cultural perspective with a dialectical view of the interaction between fundamental self-monitoring 
mechanisms addressing bodily self-awareness and psychological as well as social components of self-
knowledge. This integration widely relies on the most recent contributions from Peter Fonagy’s model of 
mentalization deficits studied in the clinical field of personality disorders. In the second section of the 
comment, I present some possible ways to tackle the problem of “extended mind” through internet devic-
es raised by Meini. In particular, the notion of extended mind is confronted with the specificities of iden-
tity building in the use of social networks. 
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█ Riassunto Le radici sociali dell’identità umana e l’interazione dei Sé – In questo articolo saranno presi in 
considerazione due aspetti principali del lavoro di Cristina Meini From Cradle to Internet. The Social Na-
ture of Personal Identity. In una prima parte l’argomento di Meini relativo al ruolo strutturante per lo svi-
luppo del sé del rispecchiamento comunicativo con i caregiver sarà analizzato alla luce della letteratura at-
tuale relativa all’architettura pluristratificata dell’identità. Propongo di integrare l’interessante prospettiva 
socio-culturale di Meini con una visione dialettica dell’interazione tra i meccanismi di base di automoni-
toraggio che si rivolgono alla consapevolezza di sé corporea e alle componenti psicologiche e sociali della 
conoscenza di sé. Questa integrazione poggia ampiamente sui contributi più recenti derivanti dal modello 
di Peter Fonagy dei deficit di mentalizzazione, indagati nel campo clinico dei disturbi di personalità. Nella 
seconda parte di questo commento presenterò alcuni modi possibili per affrontare il problema sollevato 
da Meini della “mente estesa” dai meccanismi di internet. In particolare, la nozione di mente estesa sarà 
comparata con le specificità della costruzione di identità in uso nei social network. 
PAROLE CHIAVE: Sé; Mentalizzazione; Adolescenza; Disturbi di personalità; Consapevolezza di sé corporea. 
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CRISTINA MEINI’S CONTRIBUTION OF-
FERS VERY stimulating questions for diverse 
sectors of research that, although separate, 
have shown converging interests: develop-
mental models of social cognition, philoso-
phy of mind, investigations into the nature of 
subjectivity and personal identity, the neuro-
sciences, and psychodynamic views on affec-
tive development and personality building. 
Overall, I agree with Meini, that this mul-
tidisciplinary connection starts with the crisis 
of the Cartesian approach to the self. In the 
Cartesian tradition, whose influence lasted 
up until 20th century philosophy and psy-
chology, self-experience was thought to be 
unitary, continuous throughout time, coher-
ent and, even more importantly, totally self-
transparent to the mind itself. As clearly stat-
ed by Meini, current approaches in philoso-
phy of mind, cognitive psychology and, more 
recently, neuroscience have paved the way to 
a view that not only considers the diffused 
activity of unconscious mental states, but 
that radically questions the traditional idea 
of personal introspection as the unique relia-
ble and actual source for self-consciousness. 
Contemporary perspectives point to the in-
herently illusory, transient and multi-faceted 
outlook of processes implied in the building 
of human subjectivity, especially self-awa-
reness.1 
The general idea of a multi-track model 
of self-consciousness is well accounted for by 
Meini’s quotations concerning the Neisserian 
and Gibsonian multi-layered notion of self.2 
Indeed, according to current neuroscientific 
perspectives, the sense of personal identity 
seems to hinge on a complex architecture of 
the mind in which low-level self-monitoring 
mechanisms, mainly related to the percep-
tion of body image, enteroceptive and pro-
prioceptive modifications and agency, work 
independently from higher processes in-
volved in the psychological and social defini-
tions of personal identity.3 Cristina Meini ac-
curately traces the origin of such a complex 
model back to Williams James’ tripartite no-
tion of self. What Meini interestingly and 
originally introduces is the possibility of un-
derstanding, at least some parts of self-
development, the ones more related to the 
construction of psychological and social 
identity, to social processes, including tech-
nological achievements. In her proposals, she 
is explicitly reminiscent of Vygotsky’s and 
more recent socio-constructivist perspectives. 
Given this broad and articulated framework 
for the understanding of personal identities, 
Meini explores the heuristic of the multi-
layered model of self in two proposals that I 
find intriguing from the point of view of my 
clinically informed stance. Before going into 
the details of my comments on such propo-
sals, let me briefly discuss my general point of 
view on the multilayered model proposed by 
Neisser and presented by Meini in her paper. 
 
█ The dialectic architecture of personal 
identity 
 
I share Meini’s view of parallel, multi-
layered, unconsciously organised processes 
producing what we commonly refer to as the 
self or sense of identity. I also agree that this 
progress in the understanding of self-awa-
reness has once for all ruled out the view of a 
transcendental first-person privileged self-
transparent knowledge or its awkwardly up-
dated version which calls into play brain ho-
munculi or Ego structures.4 
As a clinician, I finally acknowledge the 
importance of current research interpreting 
the self as a specific interpersonal coordinate 
emerging from transactions between social 
agents and unavoidably defined through cul-
tural symbols. However, I propose that such 
a wide framework should also consider the 
other side of the coin, that is, how the diverse 
levels of self-monitoring interact, sometime 
integrate or influence each other. I argue that 
this more dialectic stance could help in dis-
cussing some of the interesting questions 
raised by Meini herself. My analysis starts 
from the realization that self-monitoring 
processes often remain isolated from each 
other and do not actually contribute to the 
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most explicit aspect of self-identity. Some of 
these aspects of self-monitoring experience 
come to light only when something goes 
awry, for instance, in body or movement per-
ceptions. On the other hand, it has to be not-
ed that very frequently there is an interplay 
between various aspects of self-experience 
that form the Jamesian stream of conscious-
ness through which the sense of “me” is 
maintained. 
Starting from Sperry and Gazzaniga’s 
neuroscientific investigations, we know that 
the sense of continuity, unity, and coherence 
of the self derived from the Cartesian tradi-
tion is but an illusion; what Dennett defined 
as the virtual captain of the Cartesian thea-
tre. At the same time, we also acknowledge 
that individuals’ narrative and representa-
tional self-definitions are not inconsequential 
for behaviors and experience. 
On the contrary, we notice that the natu-
ral flow of subjective mental life opposes it-
self to any final attempt at self-appro-
priation: it is inherently incoherent, multi-
layered and multi-coded, and indeed impos-
sible to be fully captured through representa-
tions. However, this ineffable nature of self-
representation seems to constitute a reason 
for continuous striving on the part of what 
Gazzaniga defined as the interpreter, that is, 
the functional operator of self-descriptions 
paving the way to self-consciousness and 
identity.5 Furthermore, contemporary re-
search on the phylogenetic and ontogenetic 
meaning of self-awareness stress the problem 
of congruence between the abstract self-
descriptions and more basic mechanisms of 
organismic self-monitoring anchored to so-
matic and affective markers.6 
In the clinical field, it is possible to find  
evidence that a central aspect of severe psy-
chiatric conditions consists in the patients’ 
inability to found their identity narrative on 
the building blocks of what Meini introduced 
as the ecological and interpersonal self.7 In 
the case of autistic or psychotic individuals, 
for instance, gross biases in the perception of 
the sense of agency or the meaning of inter-
personal acts determines a profound deficit 
in the exploration and representational re-
descriptions of internal dispositions.8 Pecu-
liarly, this deficit in self-descriptions results 
in important identity distortions, that can be 
easily accounted for by the attempt to “inter-
pret” and give meaning to the altered percep-
tions of bodily and affective markers. High-
er-level representations can’t do without 
lower level self-monitoring perceptions. In 
Neisserian terms, the psychological as well as 
social self seems to be highly dependent on 
the ecological and interpersonal self. 
  
█ Introspection: the structuring role of the 
caregiver’s communicative mirroring 
 
Meini founds her constructivist position 
on two assumptions directly derived from 
Fonagy and his developmentalist colleagues 
Gergely, Csibra and Watson9: (a) introspec-
tive awareness is not given at birth, but it de-
velops secondarily in a process of social 
transactions that starts with the baby's ability 
to attribute mental states to other social 
agents and interiorize their communicative 
mirroring; (b) the access to internal states is 
by no means transparent, direct, all-encom-
passing. 
If ever, the possibility to refer to one’s 
mental activity is carried out, as suggested by 
Fonagy and colleagues who in turn quote 
MIT scholar Annette Karmiloff-Smith, 
through re-presentational re-redescriptions 
that selectively rely on some of the behavior-
al, visual, proprioceptive and enteroceptive 
indexes that accompany each internal dispo-
sition. Such indexes through which each in-
ternal state is described are then unified un-
der a conceptual label, often provided by the 
parental linguistic definition of an emotional 
state (e.g., fear, anger, joy, tiredness). The 
child is gradually brought into a world of self-
defining descriptions including external la-
bels and relative internal indexes through 
which she will be able to “recognize” and re-
present her own experience to herself. 
In order to analyze the general socio-
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constructivist position on identity building, 
at least partially embraced by Meini, I would 
start with the very beautiful passage from 
Williams James’ Principles that Cristina her-
self introduced. This passage places the em-
phasis on the highest step in Neisser’s archi-
tecture of self, namely, the social self. In this 
regard, I agree that not only the relational af-
fective matrix of self has been widely under-
estimated by both cognitive and clinical stud-
ies, but also that the relevance and impact of 
the social representations of self cannot be 
overvalued with respect to personal feelings 
of worthiness and adequacy. 
However, the inner feelings contributing 
to the sense of personal identity seem to be 
nested in a complex neural network of which 
interpersonal communication is only a part. 
In a recent update of his model of mentaliza-
tion within the attachment framework of de-
velopment, Fonagy has stated that the deve-
lopment of the self has to be understood as a 
more complex process of social learning.10 
This process of learning, in keeping with cur-
rent social Darwinian perspectives such as 
Tomasello’s, implies that each human being 
is biologically pre-wired and inherently moti-
vated to have access and share interpersonal 
models of behaviors as well as operative ap-
proaches to the problems of everyday life.11 
However, the process of imitative identifica-
tions with cultural models conveyed by other, 
more expert, social agents does not entail a 
mechanical reproduction of models of beha-
vior or socially acknowledged outlooks. 
The social model presented is interiorized 
when the child or, more generally, the indi-
vidual is recognised for her own personal fea-
tures and is treated as an epistemic, learning-
driven agent by other social agents. When 
such prerequisites are attended by the social 
model (this is the true inheritance of secure 
attachment bonds according to Fonagy and 
Luyten),12 then the child will develop the 
basic condition of “epistemic trust”. Moving 
on from such a socio-affective background 
the child will experience the possibility to 
recognize and mould her own personal moti-
vations into a network of interactions and 
contents of learning. While stressing the ulti-
mate aim of building and expanding the self 
through social interactions, Fonagy articulates 
a dialectic stance concerning the components 
leading to evaluation of social interactions 
from very early stages of development. 
According to Fonagy and Luyten, any 
evaluation of social exchanges springs from a 
multiple-track recording of interaction. 
On the one hand, structures mainly locat-
ed at the sub-cortical levels of the brain pro-
vide implicit information concerning the af-
fective values that social encounters acquire 
for the self. In a way, this implicit level of so-
cial information processing is close to what 
Damasio referred to as “values” or “bodily 
markers” or to what Meini, recalling Neisser, 
defines as the ecological and interpersonal 
self. 
On the other hand, the brain also allows 
for a more explicit understanding of the epis-
temic meaning of social transactions. Those 
interactions that do not seem to offer any en-
hancement for the child’s personal epistemic 
perspective on the world result in a progres-
sive loss of trust in the possibility for self-
development within other social relation-
ships. If these inadequate modes of interac-
tions perpetuate, just as in the case of early 
traumatic relationships,13 a condition of “ep-
istemic hypersensitivity” is engendered. This 
condition leads to short-circuited interpreta-
tions of social reality in which the individual 
compulsively seeks for epistemic mirroring 
by other people but she is then misled by the 
internal implicit negative cues sustained by 
traumatic memories of past experiences. 
In this model, therefore, there is a double-
entrance circular hypothesis as to the con-
struction of social and self-understanding. 
Information coming from biological systems 
concerning the self and the other are conti-
nuously matched and interplay with identity 
cues coming from social agents. This model 
has direct consequences for the understand-
ing of certain clinical conditions such as bor-
derline or anti-social personality disorders. 
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According to Fonagy, part of the efficacy of 
diverse psychotherapeutic strategies may be 
due to the interruption of this short-circuited 
social interpretation, resulting in the possibil-
ity of learning new self-experiences in an in-
terpersonal context.  
 
█ Psychological possibility of the extended 
mind 
 
In the second section of her stimulating 
reflections, Meini tackles an apparently sub-
versive question: can we extend our inner 
sense of self, the bodily or ecological self, to 
apparatuses that do not belong to our bodies? 
While introducing this perspective Meini is 
explicitly reminiscent of Vygotsky’s idea that 
technological devices increase perceptive and 
cognitive skills expanding the individual’s 
phenomenal reality, thus being entitled to en-
ter the domain of human mental activities.14 I 
believe that Meini’s argument is indeed com-
posed of two separate points that need to be 
discussed separately. The first point of the 
argument concerns the actual possibility of 
technological devices and related operations 
fully acquiring the property of mental activi-
ties. The second point of the argument con-
cerns the actual possibility for technological 
devices and related operations to fully ac-
quire the attribute of personalization other-
wise attributed to several aspects of individ-
ual mental functioning. 
As far as the first point of the argument is 
concerned, Meini clearly succeeds in provid-
ing direct examples (remember Maria and 
Otto’s visit to New York’s MOMA) and liter-
ature background to support the idea that 
many activities supported by technological 
devices should be in fact considered at least 
part, if not the whole part, of human mental 
activities. Nonetheless, I would like to stress 
that a positive answer to the first question 
does not necessarily entail a positive answer 
to the second point. In general, as Meini her-
self states at the beginning of her contribu-
tion, the cognitive neurosciences show us 
that only a relatively small percentage of the 
product of mental activities ends up under 
the focus of attentional mechanisms and be-
comes an object of conscious awareness.15 
Well aware of this general aspect of func-
tioning, Meini explores the exact conditions 
under which we may think that cognitive  
operations implemented via support of tech-
nological devices enter the sense of self. 
Meini’s slant on this discussion derives from 
Clark’s and Chalmers’ functionalist analysis. 
Meini interestingly tries to integrate the four 
conditions of possibility indicated by these 
two philosophers of mind with a more phe-
nomenological criterion derived from Wil-
liam James’s idea that the self is built upon 
the intimate appropriation of the world. In 
order to enhance the validity of her argument 
Meini proposes to analyze the situation of 
mental activities which are nowadays so of-
ten totally delegated to the decision-making 
heuristics of web search engines. Do these 
decisional routines really enter our sense of 
personal identities? 
I am inclined to share Meini’s view that 
this example (many other instances, as we 
shall see could be taken into account) actual-
ly meets the four criteria identified by Chal-
mers and Clark, with specific reference to the 
aspect of personal endorsement of a causal 
role played by technological operations in 
one’s own mental activities. However, I am 
less convinced of the ensuing relationship 
identified by Meini between cognitive en-
dorsment and the Jamesian notion of 
warmth, which is, the real marker of personal 
identification. Undoubtedly, the feeling of 
“warmth” should be based upon the recogni-
tion of mental causality for any mental activi-
ty engendering the sense of self. My point 
here is that the quality of personal invest-
ment in the mental activity that confers the 
sense of intimacy to any object of self-
reflection could derive from different pro-
cesses of self-recognition. Again, I refer to 
the interplay among the various layers com-
posing the architecture of the sense of self 
that Meini proposed by introducing Neisser’s 
view of identity. I propose that the analyses 
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of the concrete circumstances under which a 
sense of personalization is attributed, though 
fleetingly, to technological devices and oper-
ations can further support and specify some 
psychological margins of Meini’s reflections. 
As already discussed, psychotic individu-
als who are unable to clearly establish the 
source of their own movements and thoughts 
within the boundaries of their body report 
excruciating feelings of depersonalization 
and estrangement from themselves. In this 
extreme case, what James referred to as a 
sense of warmth can be nearly automatically 
derived by calculations pertaining to what 
Meini evoked as the ecological self. In some 
other cases, the sense of personal identity at-
tributed to operations computed for us by 
cybernetic agents can also be reached inde-
pendently of an explicit acknowledgement of 
higher levels of self-architecture. 
Many adolescents, but this is more and 
more true of adults as well, are at a loss in 
distinguishing their own mental operations 
and products from the ones computed by 
electronic devices. Many of these individuals 
tend to confound their own sense of social 
identities with the routines, outputs and 
“rules of engagement” characterizing the so-
cial network interactions to which they en-
trust so many of their acquaintances, ro-
mances, or close friendships. Many adoles-
cents coming to my office describe their 
cyber friendships or affairs as completely re-
al, even if they have not even met their coun-
ter-part. An old borderline patient I had been 
following reported feelings of void anytime 
his facebook profile was not appropriately 
rated by women in connection with him. At 
the same time, he could feel totally elated, 
describing himself as a completely different 
kind of man when a new woman friend 
joined his network of friendships. It is not 
uncommon to hear, even from people in their 
thirties, that someone’s personal appeal is 
fixed by the signs of appreciation given by 
the “network”. 
Another female patient of mine, a culti-
vated, highly educated and charming woman, 
was always complaining that as a person she 
felt at the margins, since the man she was 
having an affair with for quite a long time 
then, used to prefer other women to her in 
his chatline exchanges. Undoubtedly, adole-
scents or particularly fragile or immature in-
dividuals tend to abuse such network interac-
tions. It is also obvious that many people, 
both in their adolescence and adulthood, 
make a more flexible and more distanced use 
of such social technologies. But it is a fact 
that, at least transiently, most individuals 
build their sense of identity on these mecha-
nisms of social mirroring. It seems that this 
powerful impact is due to the fact that social 
networks are able to establish shared proce-
dures and contents of the intersubjective ne-
gotiation of identity that starting from ado-
lescence becomes a primary and conscious 
need for the individual. 
People can easily attribute a causal endor-
sement, as well as a sense of personal warmth, 
to procedures that make them feel so effec-
tive in establishing relevant social encoun-
ters. I argue that a social network is a techno-
logical tool that offers an extension of the 
phenomenal domain, in Meini’s sense, by in-
dicating how to get in touch with aspects of 
personal identities, which aspects of intimacy 
can be shared and denied, magnifying and 
minimizing intersubjective closeness. Thus, 
the “craving” for social network exchanges 
that we observe in adolescence is probably 
only the outcome of a peculiarly sensitive 
window of learning for the creation of inter-
subjective relationships characterised by in-
timacy and mutual recognition of one's own 
subjective experience. Many questions could 
arise around the nature of the factors through 
which individuals extend (or disavow) a per-
sonal quality to use of technologies. 
A clarifying step could, for instance, con-
cern the type of intersubjective communica-
tion facilitating or hindering personification. 
Fonagy drawing on Gergely’s studies has re-
cently argued that under peculiar conditions 
the child tends to spontaneously share her 
parents’ view of the world believing it’s her 
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own view.16 According to Gergely’s experi-
ments such “personalized identification” oc-
curs only when the child perceives that the 
adult proposes to her a real relationship of 
learning. A relationship in which the adult 
conveys the message to the child that she is a 
distinct epistemic agent, whose point of view 
is worth consideration. Can we imagine that 
such prerequisites are met by an electronic 
device? Why should an adolescent identify 
with a machine’s point of view? Are social 
technologies successful in moulding an indi-
vidual’s growing sense of identity because 
they closely respond to the epistemic rela-
tionship prerequisite indicated by Fonagy 
and Gergely? 
Beyond the anecdotal meaning of some of 
the examples I contributed, I believe that the 
answers to such questions may represent one 
possible way to deal with the more general 
theme of the extended mind posed by Meini. 
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